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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
In this consolidated appeal, New Jersey Retail 
Merchants Association (“Retail Merchants”), New Jersey 
Food Council (“Food Council”), and American Express 
Prepaid Card Management Corporation (“Amex Prepaid”) 
(collectively, “SVC Issuers”) challenge the constitutionality 
of 2010 N.J. Laws Chapter 25 (“Chapter 25”), which 
amended New Jersey’s unclaimed property statute, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 46:30B (2002), and provided for the custodial escheat 
of stored value cards (“SVCs” or “gift cards”) for the first 
time.1
                                              
1 This opinion is limited to the challenge brought 
against 2010 N.J. Laws Chapter 25 (“Chapter 25”) with 
respect to stored value cards (“SVCs”).  We discuss the 
companion case challenging Chapter 25 with respect to 
travelers checks, Am. Express Travel Related Services Co., 
Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, No. 10-4328, in a separate opinion. 
  SVC Issuers filed a motion for preliminary injunction 
against New Jersey Treasurer Andrew P. Sidamon-Eristoff 
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(“Treasurer”) and New Jersey Unclaimed Property 
Administrator Steven R. Harris (collectively, “New Jersey” or 
“State”) in the United States District Court on the basis that 
Chapter 25 violates the Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, 
the Supremacy Clause, the Substantive Due Process Clause, 
and the Commerce Clause2
I.  Background 
 of the United States Constitution.  
The District Court granted the motion in part and denied it in 
part.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm. 
SVCs, often called gift cards, are forms of electronic 
payment that come in two varieties: “closed loop” and “open 
loop” cards.  Closed loop cards may be redeemed only for 
merchandise or services from the retailer that issued the card.  
Retail Merchants and Food Council issue only closed loop 
cards.  Open loop cards may be redeemed at a variety of retail 
stores, including Internet sites, not affiliated with the issuer of 
                                              
2 The District Court held that SVC Issuers failed to 
show a likelihood of success on the Commerce Clause claim.  
SVC Issuers do not raise this issue on appeal.  The issue is 
only raised in an amicus brief filed by Limited Brands, Inc.  
“Although an amicus brief can be helpful in elaborating 
issues properly presented by the parties, it is normally not a 
method for injecting new issues into an appeal, at least in 
cases where the parties are competently represented by 
counsel.”  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 
429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see also Olmstead 
v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 436 n.5 (2d Cir. 
2002) (stating “an issue raised only by an amicus curiae is 
normally not considered on appeal”).  Accordingly, we 
decline to address the Commerce Clause claim. 
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the card.  Amex Prepaid issues open loop cards.  Some open 
loop cards are redeemable for cash, but most open loop cards 
issued by Amex Prepaid are only redeemable for merchandise 
or services. 
 When the purchaser tenders payment for the face value 
of the SVC, the issuer, in exchange, “promises to provide to 
the bearer [of the gift card] merchandise of equal value to the 
remaining balance” on the card.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 56:8-110c 
(2006).  The funds for the SVCs are held in a bank account 
maintained by the card issuers or in a separate database.  
Some issuers issue the cards directly, while others use 
subsidiaries, vendors, or cooperatives to issue the cards.  
Once the SVC is redeemed for purchase, each issuer 
recognizes a profit based on the difference between the 
issuer’s cost of acquiring the goods or of offering the services 
and the retail price paid by the customer. 
 All fifty states, and the District of Columbia, have a set 
of unclaimed property laws (often called escheat laws), most 
of which are based on a version of the Uniform Unclaimed 
Property Act (“UUPA”).  These laws require that once 
property has been deemed abandoned, the holder turn it over 
to the state; however, the original property owner still 
maintains the right to the property.  The purpose of unclaimed 
property laws is to provide for the safekeeping of abandoned 
property and then to reunite the abandoned property with its 
owner.  Usually, before turning over abandoned property to 
the state, the holder must attempt to return the property by 
contacting the owner, using the owner’s name and last known 
address.  If the holder is unable to return the property to the 
owner and turns it over to the state, the holder provides the 
state with the name and last known address of the owner.  The 
holder is no longer liable to the property owner once it turns 
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over the property to the state.  The state then makes an effort 
to reunite the owner with the property.  Under New Jersey’s 
custodial escheat statute, the rightful owner may file a claim 
to recover the property at any time after the property is turned 
over to the State. 
 Prior to the enactment of Chapter 25, gift certificates 
(the predecessors to SVCs) were not covered by New Jersey’s 
escheat statute.  See In re November 8, 1996, Determination 
of the State of N.J., Dept. of the Treasury, Unclaimed Prop. 
Office, 706 A.2d 1177, 1179-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998).  This was a departure from the UUPA, which did 
provide for the escheat of gift certificates.  Id. at 1179.  The 
key reason New Jersey did not escheat gift certificates was 
that they were not redeemable for cash.  Id. at 1179-80.  If the 
State were to escheat gift certificates, the issuers would have 
had to turn over the value of the gift certificates in cash to the 
State, when they were originally bound to turn over only 
merchandise or services to the owner.  Id. at 1179.  The 
Superior Court of New Jersey found that the State’s escheat 
law was not intended to “impose an obligation different from 
the obligation undertaken to the original owner” of the gift 
certificates.  Id. at 1180. 
 Chapter 25 now provides for the escheat of SVCs, 
which include closed loop cards, open loop cards redeemable 
only for merchandise or services, and open loop cards 
redeemable only for cash.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 46:30B-6t (2010).  
When an SVC is presumed abandoned, “the amount 
presumed abandoned is the amount credited to the recipient,” 
which is the entire remaining balance on the gift cards.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. 46:30B-43 (2002).  Chapter 25 also authorizes the 
Treasurer to grant exemptions to certain classes of businesses 
based on good cause.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 46:30B-42.1f (2010).  
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Finally, the statute does not apply to SVCs “issued under a 
promotional or customer loyalty program or a charitable 
program for which no consideration has been tendered.”  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. 46:30B-42.1e (2010).  Neither does it apply to 
SVCs issued by an issuer that sold less than $250,000 worth 
of SVCs in the past year.  Id. 
 Pertinent to this case, Chapter 25 presumes SVCs to be 
abandoned after two years of inactivity and requires issuers to 
transfer to the State the remaining value on the SVCs at the 
end of the two-year abandonment period.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
46:30B-42.1a (2010) (Chapter 25, § 5a).  Under Chapter 25, 
issuers “shall obtain the name and address of the purchaser or 
owner of each stored value card issued or sold and shall, at a 
minimum, maintain a record of the zip code of the owner or 
purchaser.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 46:30B-42.1c (2010) (Chapter 25, 
§ 5c).  We will refer to this as the “data collection provision.”  
In addition, the same subsection provides that 
[i]f the issuer of a stored value card does not 
have the name and address of the purchaser or 
owner of the stored value card, the address of 
the owner or purchaser of the stored value card 
shall assume the address of the place where the 
stored value card was purchased or issued and 
shall be reported to New Jersey if the place of 
business where the stored value card was sold 
or issued is located in New Jersey. 
Id.  This provision will be referenced as the “place-of-
purchase presumption.” 
 Since Chapter 25 was enacted, the Treasurer has issued 
several guidances interpreting the statute.  Notably, the 
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Treasury Guidance dated September 23, 2010 elaborates on 
the place-of-purchase presumption found in Chapter 5, § 5c: 
· If the issuer is domiciled in New Jersey, any 
unredeemed balances of stored value cards 
issued prior to the date of this announcement 
where the names and addresses or zip code 
of the purchasers or owners were not 
recorded must be reported to New Jersey. 
· If the issuer is not domiciled in New Jersey, 
any unredeemed balances of stored value 
cards issued prior to the date of this 
announcement where the names and 
addresses or zip code of the purchasers or 
owners were not recorded should be 
reported to the state in which the issuer is 
domiciled in accordance with that state’s 
unclaimed property laws. 
· If the issuer is not domiciled in New Jersey 
and the issuer’s state of domicile exempts 
this type of property from its unclaimed 
property statute, any unredeemed balances 
of stored value cards issued prior to the date 
of this announcement where the names and 
addresses or zip code of the purchasers or 
owners were not recorded must be reported 
to New Jersey if the cards were issued or 
sold in New Jersey.  In these instances, the 
issuer must maintain the address of the 
business where the stored value card was 
purchased or issued. 
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Office of the State Treasurer, State of New Jersey, Treasury 
Announcement FY 2011-03, Guidance on Implementation 
and Notice of Exemption from Certain Provisions of L.2010, 
c.25, at 3 (September 23, 2010) (emphasis added) (“Treasury 
Guidance”). 
Beginning in September 2010, Retail Merchants, Food 
Council, and Amex Prepaid filed separate complaints in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  They challenged 
Chapter 25 under the Supremacy Clause, the Due Process 
Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Contract Clause, and the 
Takings Clause of the Constitution.  They also filed motions 
for preliminary injunction to prevent the State from enforcing 
Chapter 25 while the case was pending.  In a consolidated 
November 13, 2010 opinion, the District Court preliminarily 
enjoined the retroactive application of Chapter 25 to SVCs 
redeemable for merchandise or services that were issued 
before the enactment of Chapter 25.  The Court also enjoined 
the prospective enforcement of the place-of-purchase 
presumption under Chapter 25, § 5c and the Treasury 
Guidance dated September 23, 2010.  The Court, however, 
declined to prospectively enjoin the data collection provision 
found in the same subsection, holding that the provision was 
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severable.3
The State appeals the District Court’s grant of 
preliminary injunction with respect to the retroactive 
enforcement of Chapter 25 and the prospective enforcement 
of the place-of-purchase presumption and the accompanying 
Treasury Guidance.  SVC Issuers cross-appeal the District 
Court’s denial of preliminary injunction as to the data 
collection provision and the two-year abandonment period.  
For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the District 
Court’s orders. 
  Finally, the Court declined to prospectively 
enjoin the two-year abandonment period provision under 
Chapter 25, § 5a. 
II.  Standard of Review 
 “We generally review a district court’s [grant or] 
denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion[,] 
but review the underlying factual findings for clear error and 
                                              
3 The District Court’s November 13, 2010 opinion 
stated that it was “preliminarily enjoin[ing the State] from 
enforcing subsection 5c of Chapter 25 and Treasury Guidance 
dated September 23, 2010, which apply a place-of-purchase 
presumption for all stored value cards . . . .”  Am. Express 
Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. 
Supp. 2d 556, 616-17 (D. N.J. 2010).  SVC Issuers filed a 
motion for clarification or construction of the November 13 
order.  On January 14, 2011, the District Court clarified that it 
was preliminarily enjoining the place-of-purchase 
presumption found in Chapter 25, §5c but not the data 
collection provision under the same subsection because the 
latter was severable.  Id. at 619. 
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examine legal conclusions de novo.”  Brown v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted).  “We have jurisdiction to review the order [granting 
or] denying a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1).”  Id. at 268 n.6. 
III.  Discussion 
 A court must consider four factors when ruling on a 
motion for preliminary injunction:  “(1) whether the movant 
has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; 
(2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial 
of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will 
result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and 
(4) whether granting preliminary relief will be in the public 
interest.”  Crissman v. Dover Downs Entm’t Inc., 239 F.3d 
357, 364 (3d Cir. 2001).  We will examine these factors with 
respect to each constitutional challenge. 
 A. Contract Clause 
 The Contract Clause under Article I, Section 10, 
Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State 
shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.”  To ascertain whether there has been a Contract 
Clause violation, a court must first inquire whether the 
change in State law has “operated as a substantial impairment 
of a contractual relationship.”  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 
503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (citations omitted); Nieves v. Hess 
Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 819 F.2d 1237, 1243 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(citations omitted).  If this threshold inquiry is met, the court 
must then determine “whether the law at issue has a 
legitimate and important public purpose.”  Transport Workers 
Union of Am., Local 290 v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 145 F.3d 
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619, 621 (3d Cir. 1998).  If so, the court must ascertain 
“whether the adjustment of the rights of the parties to the 
contractual relationship was reasonable and appropriate in 
light of that purpose.”  Id.  Because the Contract Clause only 
protects existing contractual relationships and legitimate 
expectations based on the law in effect at the time of the 
contract, see Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 296-99 (3d 
Cir. 1984), a preliminary injunction based on a Contract 
Clause violation would only apply retroactively to SVCs 
issued before the enactment of Chapter 25.  We hold that 
SVC Issuers showed a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits of their Contract Clause claim with respect to SVCs 
that are redeemable for merchandise or services.4
 First, under the threshold inquiry, Chapter 25 operates 
a substantial impairment on the contractual relationships of 
SVC Issuers.  In assessing substantial impairment, the court 
looks to “the legitimate expectations of the contracting 
parties,” U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 
n. 17 (1977), and whether the modification imposes an 
obligation or liability that was unexpected at the time the 
 
                                              
4 The District Court held that the SVC Issuers that sell 
prepaid SVCs redeemable for cash failed to show a 
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their 
Contract Clause claim because they did not point to “any 
express or implied contractual obligation between themselves 
and prepaid SVC purchasers that [was] impaired by Chapter 
25.”  Am. Express Travel Related Servs., 755 F. Supp. 2d at 
609.  On appeal, SVC Issuers raise no argument regarding 
this determination.  As such, their Contract Clause claim with 
respect to SVCs redeemable for cash is waived.  See Gonzalez 
v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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parties entered into the contract and relied on its terms.  Allied 
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247 (1978).  
The contractual agreement between SVC Issuers and 
purchasers provides that the balance on the gift card may be 
redeemed only for merchandise or services; thus, Issuers of 
closed loop SVCs expected to realize a profit when the bearer 
redeemed the card for the Issuers’ merchandise or services, 
and the Issuers of open loop SVCs expected to realize a 
merchant fee, which is a fee Issuers like Amex retained from 
retailers, when the bearer redeemed the card from retailers 
that accept open loop SVCs.  Decl. of Stefan Happ at 2, Am. 
Express Travel Related Servs. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. 
Supp. 2d 556 (D. N.J. 2010) (No. 10-5206).  Chapter 25 
requires SVC Issuers to submit the value of the SVCs in cash 
to the State at the end of the abandonment period, even 
though the SVCs are not redeemable for cash under the SVC 
Issuers’ contract with the customer.  Because the value of the 
SVCs includes the expected profit or merchant fee, requiring 
SVC Issuers to turn over the entire value of the SVC in cash 
effectively transfers their expected benefits to state custody.  
By imposing such an unexpected obligation on SVC Issuers, 
Chapter 25 impaired their contractual relationship.5
                                              
5 The State submits that even after the value of the 
SVCs have been turned over to the State, SVC Issuers that 
wish to profit from the gift card transactions can honor the 
card when presented and seek reimbursement from the State.  
However, if the owner never presents the card and instead 
directly files a claim with the State, SVC Issuers are removed 
entirely from the transaction and are unable to collect their 
expected profits or merchant fee.  The same result occurs if 
the owner does not present the card or file a claim with the 
State. 
  See 
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Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 247 (holding state law 
retroactively modifying compensation the company had 
agreed to pay to its employees impaired its contractual 
relationship by imposing a completely unexpected liability). 
 This impairment was substantial because SVC Issuers’ 
reliance on the expected profit or merchant fee was vital to its 
contractual relationship.  In Allied Structural Steel, 
Minnesota’s Private Pension Benefits Protection Act 
retroactively modified the company’s statutory vesting 
requirement in the funding of a pension plan, such that “the 
company’s past contributions [to the pension plan] were 
adequate when made” but “not adequate when computed 
under the [new] statutory vesting requirement.”  Id. at 246.  
Because the company’s reliance on such contribution 
requirement was vital to the contract, id., and the Minnesota 
law imposed a completely unanticipated retroactive 
obligation upon the company by “[e]ntering a field it had 
never before sought to regulate,” the Court held that the State 
law substantially impaired the company’s contractual 
relationship.  Id. at 249.  Similarly, SVC Issuers’ reliance on 
the expected profit or merchant fee was vital to their 
contractual relationships; the expected benefits supported the 
administrative cost of issuing and processing SVCs and 
allowed them to issue SVCs without charging the purchaser 
additional fees beyond the face value of the gift cards.  
Moreover, Chapter 25 imposed retroactive obligations on 
SVC Issuers that were unanticipated because New Jersey law 
never before provided for the escheat of SVCs.  Therefore, 
Chapter 25 substantially impaired the SVC Issuers’ 
contractual relationship by imposing unexpected obligations 
in an area where reliance was vital. 
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 With respect to the second inquiry, it has been 
recognized that the custodial escheat of abandoned property is 
a significant and legitimate public purpose.  See Anderson 
Nat’l Bank, 321 U.S. 233, 240 (1944) (“[I]t is no longer open 
to doubt that a state, by a procedure satisfying constitutional 
requirements, may compel surrender to it of deposit balances, 
when there is substantial ground for belief that they have been 
abandoned . . . .”).  State escheat law works to remedy the 
“broad and general social . . . problem” of reuniting 
abandoned property with its owners.  See Energy Reserves 
Grp. v. Kan. Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983).  
Chapter 25 furthers this public purpose by requiring SVC 
Issuers to retain the name and address of the purchaser or 
owner and securing State custody of the abandoned funds in 
perpetuity for the owners to reclaim. 
 However, under the third inquiry, Chapter 25 does not 
reasonably accommodate the rights of the contracting parties 
in light of the State’s public purpose because it fails to allow 
SVC issuers to collect their bargained-for expected profits or 
merchant fees.  See Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 
290, 145 F.3d at 621.  Unless the state is a contracting party, 
courts ordinarily “defer to legislative judgment as to the 
necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.”  
Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 413 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Although New Jersey is not a 
contracting party in the present case, “complete deference to a 
legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not 
appropriate [where] the State’s self-interest is at stake.”  U.S. 
Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 26. 
 Here, under the contractual relationship, SVC Issuers 
had an expectation of realizing a profit or merchant fee when 
the owner redeemed the gift card.  Notably, the purchaser 
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implicitly accepted that the SVC Issuers had an expectation of 
realizing a profit or merchant fee when the purchaser agreed 
to redeem the gift card only in exchange for merchandise or 
services.  Serving the State’s public purpose of reuniting 
abandoned property with owners did not require the State to 
entirely deprive SVC Issuers of this bargained-for benefit.  
Like many other states that escheat gift cards, New Jersey 
could have accommodated the SVC Issuers’ expectations by 
requiring them to turn over a percentage of the value of the 
abandoned gift card, reflecting a discount based on the 
expected profit or merchant fee, rather than the card’s entire 
remaining value.  See, e.g., Ala. Code § 35-12-72(a)(17) 
(escheating 60% of value of gift cards redeemable only for 
merchandise).  This would still allow the State to escheat the 
owner’s bargained-for value of the SVC in order to reunite 
the funds with the owner.  Accordingly, SVC Issuers 
established there was a reasonable probability that the State 
violated the Contract Clause by failing to make 
accommodations that were reasonable and appropriate in light 
of Chapter 25’s purpose. 
 Having shown a likelihood of success on the merits of 
their Contract Clause claim, SVC Issuers must also show that 
they will be irreparably injured by a denial of the preliminary 
injunction; granting the preliminary injunction will not result 
in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and granting the 
preliminary injunction will be in the public interest.  See 
Crissman, 239 F.3d at 364.  SVC Issuers will suffer 
irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is denied.  If the 
State enforces Chapter 25, SVC Issuers must either face 
prosecution and fines for noncompliance or turn over, in cash, 
the remaining value of existing gift cards that have not been 
redeemed within two years.  They would not be entitled to 
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receive those funds back if Chapter 25 is later found to be 
unconstitutional, due to state sovereign immunity.  See 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (stating “suit by 
private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be 
paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment”).  Granting the preliminary injunction 
would not result in a greater harm to the State because the 
State “does not have an interest in the enforcement of an 
unconstitutional law[.]”  Am. Civil Liberties Union v. 
Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Finally, granting a preliminary 
injunction would be in the public’s interest, including those of 
retailers and customers, because “the public interest [is] not 
served by the enforcement of an unconstitutional law.”  Id.  
All four preliminary injunction conditions having been met, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the 
State from retroactively enforcing Chapter 25 with respect to 
existing SVCs redeemable for merchandise or services.6
                                              
6 Although the District Court held that “Chapter 25 
could conceivably effect a taking of the gift card sale and 
redemption,” the Court did not need to “rest its decision to 
grant a preliminary injunction on the Takings claim in light of 
the . . . Contract[] Clause analysis” in favor of SVC Issuers.  
Am. Express Travel Related Servs., 755 F. Supp. 2d at 612.  
Because we affirm the District Court’s grant of preliminary 
injunction based on SVC Issuers’ Contract Clause claim, we 
need not reach the Takings Clause claim.  For the same 
reasons, we do not reach Food Council’s argument that 
Chapter 25 violates the derivative rights rule and the manifest 
injustice rule under the New Jersey state constitution. 
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 B. Federal statutory preemption under Credit 
CARD Act 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
“the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law 
of the Land,” and state law is invalid if federal law preempts 
state law.  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  “Express preemption 
occurs when a federal law contains express language 
providing for the preemption of any conflicting state law.”  
Kurns v. A.W. Chesterton Inc., 620 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citation omitted).  “Implied conflict preemption occurs 
when it is either impossible for a private party to comply with 
both state and federal requirements, or where state law stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Id. at 395-96 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  We address SVC 
Issuers’ arguments regarding express preemption and implied 
preemption in turn. 
 1. Express preemption 
 SVC Issuers failed to show a reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits of their claim that Chapter 25’s two-
year abandonment period is expressly preempted by the 
federal Credit CARD Act of 2009 (“CARD Act”).  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1693l-1(c).  Under the CARD Act, a “State law is not 
inconsistent with this subchapter if the protection such law 
affords any consumer is greater than the protection afforded 
by this subchapter.”  15 U.S.C. § 1693q.  The District Court 
found that “Chapter 25 affords consumers greater protection 
 
23 
than that provided by the CARD Act’s expiration provision”7
 SVC Issuers submit on appeal that the “greater 
protection” analysis inappropriately allows the District Court 
to weigh the relative benefits of different types of consumer 
protection mechanisms and rewrite the CARD Act, thus, 
depriving the consumer of the benefits Congress decided to 
provide and replacing them with different ones.  However, 
ultimately, the controlling language in the CARD Act is clear: 
“[a] State law is not inconsistent with this subchapter if the 
protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the 
protection afforded by this subchapter.”  15 U.S.C. § 1693q.  
Congress authorized the weighing of relative consumer 
 
because “Chapter 25 imposes no time restriction on the 
consumer’s right to recover his or her funds” and allows the 
consumer holding the SVC to receive “cash back after the 
abandonment period—a right the holder did not possess under 
his or her agreement with the SVC issuer.”  Am. Express 
Travel Related Servs. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d 
556, 592 (D. N.J. 2010).  According to the District Court, 
“[w]hile Chapter 25 may make it a more cumbersome process 
for a consumer to access his/her funds once the funds are 
presumed abandoned, it ultimately provides greater protection 
to the consumer. . . .”  Id. 
                                              
7 Under the Credit CARD Act, “it shall be unlawful for 
any person to sell or issue a gift certificate, store gift card, or 
general-use prepaid card that is subject to an expiration date 
. . . [unless] the expiration date is not earlier than 5 years after 
the date on which the gift certificate was issued, or the date 
on which card funds were last loaded to a store gift card or 
general-use prepaid card; and . . . the terms of expiration are 
clearly and conspicuously stated.”  15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1(c). 
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benefits when it explicitly allowed state laws that provided 
greater protection than the Act to be shielded from federal 
preemption.  See id. 
 In the alternative, SVC Issuers submit that even if the 
District Court had the authority to assess whether the State 
law provided greater consumer protection, Chapter 25 does 
not actually provide greater protection for consumers.  We 
review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error.  
Brown, 586 F.3d at 268.  Under this standard, we accept the 
District Court’s ultimate factual determinations unless “that 
determination either (1) is completely devoid of minimum 
evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or 
(2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary 
data.”  Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir. 
1972).  Specifically, SVC Issuers argue that it is unclear how 
the State will use the zip code of the purchaser to reunite the 
owner with the escheated gift card funds.  However, the data 
collection provision first and foremost requires SVC Issuers 
to retain the name and address of the purchaser or owner, 
which helps the State reunite the property with the owner.  
Chapter 25, § 5c.  Moreover, even if the specific process the 
State uses to operate its escheat law is unclear, we do not 
believe that this negates the overall protection Chapter 25 
provides to consumers.  First, the CARD Act only requires 
the funds to be available for five years whereas Chapter 25 
protects the funds in perpetuity.  Second, even with respect to 
non-expiring gift cards, Chapter 25 still provides greater 
protection because the consumer is able to reclaim the full 
cash value of the SVC under Chapter 25 after two years, 
whereas he would have been able to redeem only 
merchandise or services using the SVC.  Thus, the District 
Court’s finding that Chapter 25 provides greater protection to 
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consumers than the CARD Act was supported by a reasonable 
reading of the federal law and state law and was not clearly 
erroneous. 
 SVC Issuers’ reliance on the language of the Federal 
Reserve Board’s regulation is also misplaced.  The Federal 
Reserve Board, which is responsible for “prescribe[ing] 
regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act,” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1693b(a), issued a regulation stating that “State law is 
inconsistent with the requirements of the [CARD Act] . . . if it 
(i) Requires or permits a practice or act prohibited by the 
federal law.”  12 C.F.R. § 205.12(b)(2).  SVC Issuers argue 
that under Chapter 25, they are “permitted” to dishonor SVCs 
when the funds are escheated after the two-year abandonment 
period, and this is “a practice or act prohibited by [the CARD 
Act],” which requires a minimum five-year expiration period 
(unless certain disclosure requirements are met).  Id.  Thus, 
they submit that the two-year abandonment period is 
inconsistent with and preempted by the CARD Act.  
However, the Federal Reserve Board explicitly refused to 
make a general preemption determination based on 
abandonment periods, despite recognizing that many state 
laws provide for an abandonment period of shorter than five 
years.  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Final Rule, Regulation E (12 CFR 205), Docket No. R-1377, 
at 69 (Aug. 22, 2010) (“certain state laws require issuers of 
unused gift cards to remit the remaining funds to the state . . . 
after a period of time – typically three to five years after the 
card is sold or used”).  The Board reasoned that “state escheat 
laws vary significantly” and “the regulation provides that a 
state law is not inconsistent with any provision if it is more 
protective of consumers.”  Id. at 70.  Therefore, the Board 
recognized that a state law is not preempted simply because it 
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provides for an abandonment period shorter than five years, if 
the state law is ultimately more protective of consumers.  This 
reading of the Board’s regulation and explanation supports 
the District Court’s “greater consumer protection” analysis. 
  2. Implied preemption 
 SVC Issuers also failed to show that Chapter 25 is 
likely to be impliedly preempted by the CARD Act.  Implied 
conflict preemption occurs when state law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.”  English v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (citations omitted).  SVC Issuers 
contend that Chapter 25 thwarts Congress’ consumer 
protection objective by preventing consumers from easily 
accessing the SVC funds from the retailer and instead 
requiring them to file a claim with the state after two years.  
We reject this argument.  The five-year expiration provision 
was designed to ensure that consumers had access to their 
funds for at least the first five years after purchasing the gift 
cards.  15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1(c).  Chapter 25’s two-year 
abandonment period furthers this interest by protecting the 
funds in perpetuity and allowing consumers to access those 
funds in cash by filing a claim with the State.  SVC Issuers 
failed to present any evidence that Congress was concerned 
with the exact method by which consumers could access 
those funds. 
 In addition, SVC Issuers submit that the two-year 
abandonment period would deprive them of the economic 
incentive to adopt longer expiration periods because their 
expected profit would be turned over to the State at the end of 
the two-year period, regardless of the SVC’s expiration date.  
And because longer expiration periods benefit customers, 
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they argue that Chapter 25’s effect on this incentive structure 
stands as an obstacle to the customer protection purpose of 
the CARD Act.  But the new abandonment period renders 
longer expiration periods unnecessary because after two years 
from the date of purchasing or using the SVC, the customers 
can access the funds in cash in perpetuity.  Thus, the two-year 
abandonment period does not stand as an obstacle to the 
congressional purpose of protecting customer interests. 
 Because we agree with the District Court that SVC 
Issuers failed to show a likelihood of success on their federal 
statutory preemption claim with respect to the two-year-
abandonment period found in Chapter 25, Section 5a, we 
need not address the remaining preliminary injunction factors. 
 C. Federal common law preemption under 
Texas v. New Jersey 
 SVC Issuers submit that Chapter 25 and the Treasury 
Guidance are preempted by the escheat priority rules 
announced in Texas v. New Jersey (Texas), 379 U.S. 674, 
681-82 (1965), and reaffirmed in Pennsylvania v. New York 
(Pennsylvania), 407 U.S. 206, 217-18 (1972), and Delaware 
v. New York (Delaware), 507 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1993).  The 
State contends that its implementation of Chapter 25 through 
the Treasury Guidance comports with the priority rules 
established by the Supreme Court.  We agree with the District 
Court that SVC Issuers demonstrated a reasonable likelihood 
of success on their claim that Chapter 25’s place-of-purchase 
presumption as well as the Treasury Guidance are preempted 
under federal common law.  The language of Chapter 25’s 
place-of-purchase presumption directly contradicts the second 
priority rule announced in Texas.  And even if the Guidance 
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were a proper exercise of the Treasurer’s power8
  1. Chapter 25 
, it is also 
preempted under Texas.  Moreover, we agree that the data 
collection provision is severable from the place-of-purchase 
presumption; thus, the data collection provision may stand 
alone even if the place-of-purchase presumption is preempted 
under federal common law. 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
“the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law 
of the Land,” and state law is invalid if federal law preempts 
state law.  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  It is undisputed that state 
law can be preempted by federal common law as well as 
federal statutes.  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 
518 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating federal common 
law can displace state law in limited instances, such as areas 
involving interstate disputes).  “Implied conflict preemption 
occurs when it is either impossible for a private party to 
comply with both state and federal requirements, or where 
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  
Kurns, 620 F.3d at 395-96 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
                                              
8 The District Court held that the Treasury Guidance 
was a proper exercise of the Treasurer’s power.  Am. Express 
Travel Related Servs., 755 F. Supp. 2d at 602-03.  We need 
not address this issue because we hold that SVC Issuers 
showed a likelihood of success on their claim that the 
Treasury Guidance is preempted under federal common law. 
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In Texas, the Supreme Court established two priority 
rules to resolve conflicts among states over unclaimed 
intangible property.  379 U.S. at 680-82.  When a property is 
deemed abandoned, the first opportunity to escheat the 
property belongs to “the State of the last known address of the 
creditor, as shown by the debtor’s books and records.”  Id. at 
682.  We refer to this as the primary rule.  If the primary rule 
fails because there is no record of any address for a creditor 
or because the creditor’s last known address is in a State 
which does not provide for the escheat of abandoned 
property, the secondary rule gives the right to escheat to the 
State in which the debtor is incorporated until another state 
comes forward with proof that it has a superior right to 
escheat.  Id. 
Under Chapter 25’s place-of-purchase presumption, in 
all instances where the address of the purchaser is unknown, 
the address of the place of purchase is substituted for the 
address of the purchaser.9
                                              
9 Chapter 25’s place-of-purchase presumption provides 
that “[i]f the issuer of a stored value card does not have the 
name and address of the purchaser or owner . . . the address 
of the owner or purchaser of the stored value card shall 
assume the address of the place where the stored value card 
was purchased.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 46:30B-42.1c (Chapter 25, 
§ 5c). 
  Then, in cases where the address 
of the purchaser for an SVC purchased in New Jersey is 
unknown, New Jersey would escheat the property under 
Chapter 25; however, under the secondary rule in Texas, the 
SVC Issuer’s state of incorporation would escheat the 
property.  Therefore, when the SVC Issuer is not incorporated 
in New Jersey, it would be impossible for the Issuer to 
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comply with both Chapter 25’s place-of-purchase 
presumption and federal common law under Texas because 
two states cannot both escheat the same abandoned property.  
See Texas, 379 U.S. at 676 (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. 
Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 82 (1961)) (“[T]he Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents more than one 
State from escheating a given item of property. . . .”).  
Accordingly, the place-of-purchase presumption is preempted 
under Texas.  See Kurns, 620 F.3d at 395-96. 
 2. Treasury Guidance 
 On appeal, the State contends that Chapter 25, as 
implemented through the Treasury Guidance, comports with 
the Texas priority rules.  For the following reasons, we hold 
that SVC Issuers met their burden of showing that both 
Chapter 25 and the Treasury Guidance are likely preempted 
under the Supreme Court precedent in Texas, Pennsylvania, 
and Delaware. 
To evaluate SVC Issuers’ federal preemption claim 
regarding the Treasury Guidance, we find it helpful to first 
review the federal common law in question.  In Texas v. New 
Jersey, the Supreme Court resolved a claim brought by Texas 
against New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Sun Oil Company 
for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the right to 
claim abandoned intangible property through escheat.  379 
U.S. at 675.  Four different possible rules were submitted by 
the parties regarding the priority in which states should be 
allowed to escheat abandoned property.  Id. at 678.  Texas 
argued that the State with the “most significant ‘contacts’ 
with the debt” should be given the right to escheat, id., while 
Pennsylvania contended that the state in which the debtor’s 
principal office is located should have priority to escheat over 
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other states.  Id. at 680.  The Supreme Court rejected both 
options because these tests created too much uncertainty and 
would inevitably have led the courts to make case-by-case 
determinations based on specific facts.  Id. at 678-80.  This 
result would directly contradict the Court’s intent to settle the 
escheat disputes “once and for all by a clear rule which 
[would] govern all types of intangible obligations like these 
and to which all States may refer with confidence.”  Id. at 
678.  In the end, the Court adopted Florida’s proposed rule,10 
giving the state of the creditor’s last known address the first 
priority right to escheat, because this rule fairly recognized 
that the creditor, not the holder, was the owner of the 
property, and the “rule involves a factual issue simple and 
easy to resolve, and leaves no legal issue to be decided.”  Id. 
at 681.  The Court gave the debtor’s domiciliary state the 
second right to escheat the abandoned property, until another 
state proved its superior right to escheat, because this rule had 
the “obvious virtue of clarity and ease of application” that 
created the “needed certainty” in this area of dispute among 
states. 11
                                              
10 The Texas v. New Jersey Court permitted Florida to 
intervene “since it claimed the right to escheat the portion of 
Sun [Oil]’s escheatable obligations owing to persons whose 
last known address was in Florida.”  Texas v. New Jersey, 379 
U.S. 674, 677 (1965). 
  Id. at 680, 682. 
11 However, the Court declined to give the debtor’s 
domiciliary state the first priority right to escheat, as proposed 
by New Jersey, because it would not have been fair to let such 
a “minor factor” allow a fortuitous state in which the debtor 
“happened to incorporate itself” to claim rights to abandoned 
property all over the country.  Texas, 379 U.S. at 680. 
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As evidenced by the Texas Court’s rationale behind 
fashioning the priority rules, its primary concern was to 
unambiguously and definitively resolve disputes among states 
regarding the right to escheat abandoned property.  Indeed, 
the Court explicitly recognized that the “case could have been 
resolved otherwise, for the issue here [was] not controlled by 
statutory or constitutional provisions or by past decisions. 
. . .”  Id. at 683.  The Court’s ultimate resolution was 
“fundamentally a question of ease of administration and of 
equity.”  Id. 
 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Texas priority rules 
in two subsequent cases: Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 
at 214-15, and Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. at 498-99.  In 
Pennsylvania, because Western Union did not keep records of 
the creditor’s identity or last known address, the debtor’s state 
of incorporation was positioned to claim a large portion of the 
unclaimed funds.  407 U.S. at 211-12.  In response, 
Pennsylvania proposed that for cases involving transactions 
where the debtor does not keep records showing the address 
of the creditor, “the[s]tate of origin of the transaction,” i.e., 
the state of the place of purchase, should have the right to 
escheat the abandoned property, rather than the state of the 
debtor’s domicile as was required under the second priority 
rule in Texas.  Id. at 213-14.  The Court rejected 
Pennsylvania’s request, recognizing that “the place-of-
purchase . . . rule[] might permit intangible property rights to 
be ‘cut off or adversely affected by . . . a forum having no 
continuing relationship to any of the parties’” to the 
transaction.  Id. at 213.  In addition to finding that the state of 
purchase had insufficient ties to the creditor or debtor to 
justify giving it the right to escheat, the Court held that “the 
likelihood of a ‘windfall’ for [the state of the debtor’s 
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domicile was not] a sufficient reason for carving out an 
exception to the Texas rule.”  Id. at 214. 
 In the present case, New Jersey similarly adopts a 
place-of-purchase presumption, which, under the Treasury 
Guidance, allows the State to escheat abandoned property by 
virtue of the fact that the property was purchased in New 
Jersey.12
 The State submits that without the place-of-purchase 
presumption, SVC Issuers that are incorporated in states that 
do not escheat abandoned property would unfairly have the 
  But New Jersey, as the state in which the SVC was 
purchased, does not have a sufficient connection with any of 
the parties to the transaction to claim a right to escheat the 
abandoned property.  See Pennsylvania 407 U.S. at 213.  As 
the Court denied Pennsylvania’s place-of-purchase rule 
because “only a [s]tate with a clear connection to the creditor 
or debtor may escheat,” Delaware, 507 U.S. at 504 
(discussing Court’s holding in Pennsylvania), the District 
Court correctly enjoined New Jersey’s place-of-purchase 
presumption that would have allowed the State to escheat 
SVCs when it lacked a clear connection to the owner or 
issuer. 
                                              
12 Under the Treasury Guidance, the place-of-purchase 
assumption applies when the issuer does not have the name 
and address of the owner or purchaser, the issuer is not 
domiciled in New Jersey, and the state of domicile exempts 
the property from its unclaimed property statute.  Office of 
the State Treasurer, State of New Jersey, Treasury 
Announcement FY 2011-03, Guidance on Implementation 
and Notice of Exemption from Certain Provisions of L.2010, 
c.25, at 3 (September 23, 2010) (“Treasury Guidance”). 
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right to retain the abandoned property.  But the Pennsylvania 
Court held that “the likelihood of a ‘windfall’ for [the state of 
the debtor’s domicile was not] a sufficient reason for carving 
out an exception to the Texas rule.”  407 U.S. at 214.  
Likewise, the potential of a windfall for the SVC Issuers that 
are incorporated in states that do not escheat abandoned 
property does not merit departing from the established 
priority rules.  To depart from the Texas priority rules here 
would require us “to do precisely what [the Supreme Court] 
said should be avoided – that is, ‘to decide each escheat case 
on the basis of its particular facts or to devise new rules of 
law to apply to ever-developing new categories of facts.’”  Id. 
at 215 (citing Texas, 379 U.S. at 679). 
 Our analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that a state’s power to escheat is derived from the 
principle of sovereignty.  As the Delaware Court recognized, 
“the secondary rule protects the interests of the debtor’s 
[s]tate as sovereign over the remaining party to the underlying 
transaction.”  507 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added).  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized that the sovereign 
maintains authority over abandoned property, including the 
right to escheat the property.  See Texas, 379 U.S. at 675.  
The ability to escheat necessarily entails the ability not to 
escheat.  To say otherwise could force a state to escheat 
against its will, leading to a result inconsistent with the basic 
principle of sovereignty.  Various considerations might 
motivate states not to exercise custodial escheat.  For 
example, because companies might find the absence of state 
custodial escheat attractive, states may want to incentivize 
companies to incorporate in their jurisdiction by choosing not 
to escheat abandoned property.  In reaffirming the Texas rule, 
the Supreme Court “detect[ed] no inequity in rewarding a 
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State whose laws prove[d] more attractive to firms that wish 
to incorporate.”  Delaware, 507 U.S. at 507.  Accordingly, 
the Court intended that a state’s decision, regarding the 
exercise of custodial escheat under the secondary rule, would 
be respected under the principle of sovereignty. 
 But the place-of-purchase presumption, executed in 
accordance with the Treasury Guidance, allows New Jersey to 
infringe on the sovereign authority of other states.  Even 
when states decide not to exercise custodial escheat with the 
intent of allowing the holders to maintain custody of the 
property, the place-of-purchase presumption gives New 
Jersey the right to make the holder, SVC Issuers in this case, 
turn over the property to the State.  When fashioning the 
priority rules, the Supreme Court did not intend such a result, 
which would give states the right to override other states’ 
sovereign decisions regarding the exercise of custodial 
escheat. 
Finally, we must remember that the Texas Court’s 
primary concern was to clearly and definitively resolve 
disputes among states regarding the right to escheat 
abandoned property.  379 U.S. 678-83.  However, allowing 
states to implement additional priority rules like the one 
proposed by New Jersey would result in competing state 
claims to abandoned property.  If we assume that Chapter 
25’s place-of-purchase presumption were to apply in New 
Jersey and that another state enacted a law that escheated 
property based on the issuer’s principal place of business, the 
two states’ laws would collide when an SVC issuer with its 
principal place of business in the other state sold an SVC in 
New Jersey.  This would result in “so much uncertainty and 
threaten so much expensive litigation that the States might 
find that they would lose more in litigation expenses than 
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they might gain in escheats.”  Texas, 379 U.S. at 679.  Such 
conflict would offend the Supreme Court’s intent to use the 
two priority rules to resolve disputes among states with 
administrative ease and equity.  See Texas, 379 U.S. at 683.  
Because the State law would stand as an obstacle to executing 
the purpose of the federal law, see Kurns, 620 F.3d at 395-96, 
SVC Issuers satisfied their burden of showing that Chapter 
25’s place-of-purchase presumption and the Treasury 
Guidance are likely preempted under Texas, Pennsylvania, 
and Delaware.  SVC Issuers also satisfied the remaining 
preliminary injunction factors for the same reasons set forth 
in our discussion of their Contract Clause claim.  All four 
preliminary injunction conditions having been met, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in preliminarily 
enjoining Chapter 25’s place-of-purchase presumption. 
  3. Severability of the data collection 
provision 
 SVC Issuers moved for clarification or construction of 
the District Court’s November 13 Order, which provided that 
“the State is preliminarily enjoined from enforcing subsection 
5c of Chapter 25 and Treasurer Guidance dated September 
23, 2010, which apply a place-of-purchase presumption for 
all stored value cards . . . .”  Am. Express Travel Related 
Servs., 755 F. Supp. 2d at 616-17.  The District Court 
clarified that its order preliminarily enjoined the place-of-
purchase presumption of subsection 5c of Chapter 25 but not 
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the data collection provision13
 The issue of severability of a state statute is a question 
of state law, Old Coach Dev. Corp. v. Tanzman, 881 F.2d 
1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1989), and requires an inquiry into 
legislative intent.  Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. Sills, 
289 A.2d 257, 258 (N.J. 1972) (per curiam).  Under this 
inquiry, we must determine whether “the objectionable 
feature [can] be excised without substantial impairment of or 
conflict with the over-all legislative purpose . . . .”  N.J. 
Chapter, Am. Inst. of Planners v. N.J. State Bd. of Prof’l 
Planners, 227 A.2d 313, 319 (N.J. 1967).  To sever a part of a 
statute, “there must be such a manifest independence of the 
parts as to clearly indicate a legislative intention that the 
constitutional insufficiency of the one part would not render 
the remainder inoperative.”  Affiliated Distillers Brands 
Corp., 289 A.2d at 259 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 under the same subsection 
because the latter was severable.  Id. at 619.  In addition, it 
concluded that SVC Issuers failed to meet their burden of 
showing that the data collection provision should be 
preliminarily enjoined.  Id. at 623. 
 SVC Issuers submit that the data collection provision 
was not meant to be a stand-alone provision.  They argue that 
                                              
13 The data collection provision states that issuers 
“shall obtain the name and address of the purchaser or owner 
of each stored value card issued or sold and shall, at a 
minimum, maintain a record of the zip code of the owner or 
purchaser.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 46:30B-42.1c (Chapter 25, § 5c).  
It precedes the place-of-purchase presumption provision 
under the same subsection. 
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the State Legislature enacted the place-of-purchase 
presumption as a safe harbor to the data collection provision, 
thereby allowing SVC Issuers that find the data collection 
provision too onerous to opt-out and rely on the place-of-
purchase presumption.  We reject their argument because the 
consumer protection purpose of Chapter 25 evinces that the 
State Legislature intended the data collection provision to 
stand alone in case a related provision were struck down.  
Chapter 25 was enacted to ensure that SVC owners’ rights to 
the funds would be not forfeited by the passage of time and to 
reunite customers with their property.  The data collection 
provision requiring issuers to maintain records of the 
purchaser or owner furthers this purpose by making it more 
likely that the State will be able to reunite the owner with the 
abandoned SVC funds.  Thus, the Legislature did not intend 
the constitutional insufficiency of the place-of-purchase 
presumption to render the data collection inoperative. 
 When “different parts of the statute are not so 
intimately connected with and dependent upon each other so 
as to make the statute one composite whole[,] 
unconstitutional parts may be rejected and the constitutional 
parts may stand.”  Lane Distr. v. Tilton, 81 A.2d 786, 796-97 
(N.J. 1951) (citations omitted).  An example of the sort of 
dependency that makes the statute one composite whole is 
where a provision defining terms used in the statute cannot be 
severed from the remainder of the statute without rendering 
the statute meaningless or confusing.  Id. at 797.  However in 
the instant case, the data collection requirement is not so 
intimately connected with the place-of-purchase presumption.  
Although the latter works to override the Texas priority 
scheme by presuming that the address of the purchaser is that 
of the place of purchase, the former aids the State in 
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determining what state is entitled to escheat the SVC in 
accordance with the Texas priority scheme. 
 SVC Issuers argue, in the alternative, that the data 
collection provision itself is preempted by federal common 
law because it does not further the Texas priority scheme.  In 
their view, the Texas line of cases requires states to determine 
the last known address of the actual owner of the abandoned 
property in order to properly apply the first priority rule.  
They submit that retaining the zip code of the purchaser does 
nothing to reunite the abandoned property with the actual 
owner, often the recipient, of the gift card.  We agree with the 
District Court’s rejection of this argument.  Texas and its 
progeny “authorize [s]tates to require issuers of intangible 
property to collect the last known address of the purchaser 
and to rely on that address in reuniting the ‘owner’ with the 
abandoned property.”  Am. Express Travel Related Servs., 
755 F. Supp. 2d at 621.  Moreover, the Supreme Court 
explained, “either a payee or a sender” may redeem a money 
order because either can be considered the creditor.  
Delaware, 507 U.S. at 503 (citing Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 
213).  Similarly, either the purchaser or recipient of the gift 
card may redeem the gift card because either can be 
considered the creditor.  And the Supreme Court “has 
consistently permitted states to escheat based on the last 
known address of the purchaser.”  Am. Express Travel 
Related Servs., 755 F. Supp. 2d at 621 (citing Pennsylvania, 
407 U.S. at 215 and Delaware, 507 U.S. at 503). 
 In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying a preliminary injunction of the data collection 
provision.  Analysis of the State Legislature’s intent suggests 
that Chapter 25’s data collection provision is severable from 
the place-of-purchase presumption.  In addition, SVC Issuers 
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did not meet their burden of showing that the data collection 
provision on its own is likely preempted by federal common 
law.  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court. 
 D. Substantive Due Process Claim 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. 
Amend. XIV, § 1.  It is well established that the Due Process 
Clause contains both a procedural and substantive 
component.  Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139 
(3d Cir. 2000) (citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992)).  Substantive due 
process contains two lines of inquiry, one that applies when a 
party challenges the validity of a legislative act, and one that 
applies to the challenge of a non-legislative action.  Id.  In a 
case challenging a legislative act, as here, the act will 
withstand scrutiny if (1) there is a legitimate state interest that 
(2) could be rationally furthered by the statute.  Id. (citation 
omitted).  The rational basis test, although “not a toothless 
one,” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976), requires 
significant deference to the legislature’s decision-making and 
assumptions.  Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 
639, 645 (3d Cir. 1995).  “[T]hose attacking the rationality of 
the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative 
every conceivable basis which might support it[.]’”  FCC v. 
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (quoting 
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 
(1973)). 
 We first address whether there is a legitimate state 
interest.  The State identifies several legitimate interests 
relevant to our analysis.  In general, taking custody of 
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abandoned property is a legitimate state interest.  See 
Delaware, 507 U.S. at 497 (“States as sovereigns may take 
custody of or assume title to abandoned personal property. . . 
.”).  Specifically, the State has a legitimate interest in 
protecting New Jersey customers and modernizing its 
unclaimed property laws, which were the purposes explicitly 
identified by the State Legislature.  Assemb. Budget 
Committee, Statement to Assemb. No. 3002, June 24, 2010 
(stating that “the primary purposes of [Chapter 25] are to 
protect New Jersey consumers from certain commercial 
dormancy fee practices and modernize the State’s unclaimed 
property laws”). 
SVC Issuers protest that the primary purpose of 
enacting Chapter 25 was to raise revenue for the State, which 
is not a legitimate state interest.  But even if revenue-raising 
was the primary purpose behind enacting Chapter 25, as long 
as it was not the only legitimate purpose underlying the 
legislation, Chapter 25 will pass rational basis examination.  
See Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 569 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(stating the “legitimate purpose justifying the provision need 
not be the primary purpose of the provision”).  Here, the State 
has sufficiently identified several state interests, including 
protecting consumers and modernizing its unclaimed property 
laws.  Thus, we now examine whether these purposes are 
rationally furthered by Chapter 25.  See Nicholas, 227 F.3d at 
139. 
 SVC Issuers submit that even if Chapter 25 was 
enacted to further a legitimate state interest, the two-year 
abandonment period, the two exemptions to Chapter 25, and 
the data collection provision do not rationally relate to that 
goal.  We review each challenged provision in turn. 
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SVC Issuers first argue that the two-year abandonment 
period is not rationally related to protecting consumers when 
consumers are better protected under a five-year 
abandonment period under the CARD Act.  Thus, they 
contend that the State had no rational basis for choosing an 
abandonment period of two years rather than an abandonment 
period of at least five years.  However, the District Court 
correctly found that “Chapter 25 affords consumers greater 
protection than that provided by the CARD Act’s expiration 
provision” because “Chapter 25 imposes no time restriction 
on the consumer’s right to recover his or her funds” and 
allows the consumer holding the SVC to receive “cash back 
after the abandonment period—a right the holder did not 
possess under his or her agreement with the SVC issuer.”  
Am. Express Travel Related Servs., 755 F. Supp. 2d at 592.  
Although the SVC Issuers argue that there was no legislative 
finding regarding this two-year abandonment period, under 
rational basis review, “legislative choice . . . may be based on 
rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical 
data.”  Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (citations omitted).  
Thus, Chapter 25’s two-year abandonment period, even 
without specific legislative findings, rationally relates to the 
legitimate state interest of protecting consumers. 
SVC Issuers next contend that Chapter 25’s two 
exemptions to New Jersey’s escheat laws are not rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.  Under the first 
exemption, single issuers that sell less than $250,000 in gift 
cards in any given year are exempt from Chapter 25.  
According to the SVC Issuers, small businesses that sell more 
than $250,000 in gift cards or that are franchised are not 
exempt from Chapter 25, so they are placed at a competitive 
disadvantage for no rational reason.  This argument fails to 
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defeat rational basis scrutiny, as it merely reflects SVC 
Issuers’ policy disagreement with the New Jersey Legislature.  
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (holding that under the rational 
basis scrutiny for substantive due process, courts are not free 
to invalidate state law because they disagree with the 
underlying policy decisions).  The State could conceivably 
want to protect smaller businesses and businesses that do not 
derive substantial revenue from gift cards.  Requiring these 
businesses to implement procedures to retain the purchaser 
information in accordance with the data collection provision 
could be prohibitively expensive compared to the revenue 
generated from gift card sales and drive them out of business.  
Also, the State could have rationally decided to apply its 
escheat laws to small businesses operating as franchises under 
a common trade name; these businesses are able to market 
that trade name in selling SVCs redeemable at other 
locations, which allows them to be more profitable and to 
operate without state protection offered by the exemption. 
 Under the second exemption, gift cards issued under a 
promotional or customer loyalty program or a charitable 
program, where the owner of the card did not tender any 
monetary or other consideration, are not subject to Chapter 
25.  SVC Issuers argue that this exemption irrationally applies 
only to issuers that do not receive any payment but does not 
apply to issuers that receive partial payment for the card.  
Again, this argument only reflects the SVC Issuers’ policy 
disagreement with the New Jersey Legislature and fails to 
defeat rational basis scrutiny.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.  
The Legislature could have rationally concluded that an issuer 
offering cards for charitable purposes in exchange for 
monetary or other consideration may seek to obtain a tax 
benefit for the difference between the payment received and 
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the full value of the card.  In this case, the issuer would not 
need additional protection through Chapter 25’s exemption 
provision.  The Legislature also may have rationally decided 
to encourage issuers to receive no consideration in exchange 
for cards issued under promotional, loyalty, or charitable 
programs. 
 Finally, SVC Issuers contend that the data collection 
provision does not rationally relate to the legitimate state 
interest of protecting consumers because retaining the zip 
code of the purchaser does not help the State reunite the 
property with the true owner of the gift card, which is usually 
the recipient of the card.  However, retaining the zip code of 
the purchaser or owner rationally furthers the State’s 
legitimate interest in determining which state has the right to 
escheat the abandoned property under the first priority rule in 
Texas.  See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 289 (1986) 
(stating state has legitimate interest in taking steps to 
implement valid federal law); Delaware, 507 U.S. at 497-98 
(holding, under the primary rule, “the power to escheat the 
debt should be accorded to the State of the creditor’s last 
known address”).  Moreover, even when the property cannot 
be returned to the owner, the State’s unclaimed property law 
rationally relates to the goal of protecting the abandoned 
property by safeguarding it in a trust account and making it 
available for consumers to reclaim in perpetuity.  For all the 
reasons stated, we agree with the District Court that SVC 
Issuers failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success 
on their substantive due process claim.  Thus, we need not 
address the remaining preliminary injunction factors. 
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IV.  Conclusion 
 We hold that SVC Issuers met their burden of showing 
a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their 
Contract Clause claim and satisfied the remaining preliminary 
injunction factors; accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s 
order preliminarily enjoining Chapter 25’s retroactive 
application with respect to existing SVCs redeemable for 
merchandise or services.  SVC Issuers also successfully 
established that the place-of-purchase presumption and the 
accompanying Treasury Guidance are likely preempted by 
federal common law; thus, we affirm the District Court’s 
grant of preliminary injunction with respect to the prospective 
application of the place-of-purchase presumption and the 
accompanying Treasury Guidance.  We also hold that the data 
collection provision is severable from the place-of-purchase 
presumption, so the District Court did not err in enjoining the 
latter without enjoining the former.  Finally, we hold that 
SVC Issuers failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success 
on the merits of their federal statutory preemption claim and 
their substantive due process claim.  For all the foregoing 
reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders. 
